The market for rail passenger service in the United States has been grossly underestimated and badly misinterpreted. In 1971, the year of the corporation's birth, neither Amtrak's detractors nor many of its advocates would have forecast the growth in ridership that occurred in the subsequent decade. This increase from 16 million to 22 million passengers took place on a system that experienced scant change in route miles and only a small increase in the number of trains.
Citing small use of long-distance trains between end terminals, Amtrak management and Department of Transportation (DOT) policy makers in the corporation's early years almost wrote off long-haul markets. Often overlooked was the fact that long-distance trains also provide travel opportunities for short- and medium-distance travel. Long-distance trains experienced exceptionally strong traffic increases, often leading ridership growth.
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| Carrier |
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| Amtrak | 75.6 | 14.1 | 5.7 | 4.6 |
| BR (Britain) | 4.4 | 95.6 | ||
| SNCF (France) | 9.5 | 90.5 | ||
| SBB (Switzerland) | 100.0 | |||
| RENFE (Spain) | 16.3 | 83.7 | ||
| Amtrak | 2.3 |
| DB (Germany) | 37 |
| SNCF (France) | 23 |
| OBB (Austria) | 27 |
| SBB (Switzerland) | 61 |
| NS (Netherlands) | 90 |
While playing down long-distance travel growth opportunities, Amtrak emphasized the possibilities in a number of corridors-routes serving closely spaced metropolitan areas. Although the corporation identified more than a dozen of these corridors, increases in service have only taken place on those where external state (New York, Michigan, California) or federal (Northeast Corridor-Boston-New York-Washington) pressure was exerted.
On several routes linking large urban centers separated by short distances, only one passenger train a day operates and no effort has been made to increase frequencies. There appears to be a serious lack of sensitivity to the fact that the intercity travel market requires frequent service. The argument is often heard that since ridership is not at capacity on the single train operating in a corridor, no further growth could be expected.
When, at the behest of the state of California, Amtrak increased the frequency of trains between Los Angeles and San Diego from three to six a day, ridership tripled. Market research apparently has failed to consider total travel volume by other modes (air, bus, automobile) and expects rail to capture a very limited share. The approach is neither aggressive nor upbeat.
Failure to understand the diverse travel preferences of the public is another marketing weakness. Although people travel for different purposes and come from many socioeconomic and age groups, the assumption is that all can adjust their travel plans to take the one train, fit into the same type of accommodations, and be satisfied with limited food and beverage offerings. The tendency is to fit customers into what is offered, rather than to design an attractive service that meets customer desires.
Pricing is also a part of marketing. Amtrak marketing policy has been to maximize revenues through keeping fares at a high level, resulting in Amtrak tariffs that are often totally out of line with competitive modes. Little is done in the way of incentive pricing to encourage repeat rides, and fare policies seem incapable of rapid change to meet fluctuating demand.
Advertising has been severely limited because of budgetary constraints, but a large share of expenditures have been devoted to national image' building, rather than to identifying how Amtrak might satisfy specific travel desires.